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[So F. No. 18496. In Bank.

Aug. 14, 1953.J

WALTER ALVES, Petitioner, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMMISSION et a1.. Respondents.
[1] Oarriers-Oarrtage of Property.-Evidence that a trucker is
serving all profitable business offered within limitations of
.equipment, that vast majority of shippers are served without
contractual arrangements, and that no limit is placed on type
or weight of product carried or on number of shippers seryed,
could support a conclusion of Public Utilities Commission
that trucker unequivocally intended to dedicate his propel'ty
to public use.
[2] Automobile Stages-Highway Carriers.-A "highway COIDmon carrier . . . subject to regulation as such" by Pul)lie
Utilities Commission is a highway carrier transporting "property as 8 common carrier for compensation
. between
fixed termini or over a regular route," while a common carrier
by auto truck which does not operate between fixed termini
or over a regular route is a "radial highway common carrier." (Pub. Uti!. Code. §§ 213. 3513. 3516.)
[8] ld.-Highway Oarriers.-A "highway contract carrier" is
every highway carrier which is not a common carrier operating between fixed termini or over a regular route; if it does
not operate as a common carrier, the highway contract carrier may operate between fixed termini or over a regular
route. (Pub. Util. Code. § 3517.)
[4] ld.-Highway Oarriers.-A trucker who holds permits to
operate both as a radial highway common carrier and as a
highway contract carrier could legally operate as a common
carrier; he could also transport goods as a contract carrier
between fixed termini or over 8 regular route, but he could

[1) See Cal. Jnr. lO-Yr.Supp. (1948 Rev.), Motor Transportation, § 3; Am.Jur., Motor Transportation, § 3.
(2) See Cal.Jur. lO-Yr.Bupp (1948 Rev.), Motor Transportation, § 2.
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Carriers, § 17; [2-6] Automobile
Stages, §L

)
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Dot operate as a common carrier between fixed termini or
over a· regular route.
[5] Id.-Righway Oarriers.-Rule of Public Utilities Commission that it will not consider a carrier's operations in segments and that, if a carrier operntes a portion of an integrated business as a common carrier anel anether portion as
a contract carrier between fixed termini, the commission will
combine the entire business to find tllat the carrier is operating as a common carrier between fixed termini, is arbitrary
and unreasonable, at least as applied to a carrier holding both
radial highway common carrier and highway contract carrier permits.
[6] Id.-Righway Oarriers.-Clear implication of Highway Carriers Act, § 4 (now Pub. Util. Code, § 3542), is that a carrier
may engage in both common and contract can'iage so long as
the same commodities are not carried between the same
points in both capacities.

PROCEEDING to review an order of Public Utilities Commission directing petitioner to cease from operating as a highway common carrier. Order annulled.
lIarquam C. George for Petitioner.
Everett C. McKeage and J. Thomason Phelps for Respondents.
EDMONDS, J.-The Public Utilities. Commission instituted an investigation on its own motion into the operations
and practices of Walter Alves, doing business as Alves Service
Transportation. Following a hearing, the commission entered
its order directing Alves to cease and desist from operating
as a highway common carrier between certain designated
cities unless and until he obtained a certificate of publi(\ convenience and necessity. The order also suspend.ed his permits
to operate as a radial highway common carrier and as a highway contract carrier until further order of the commission
upon a showing of good cause.
In its opinion, the commission said: "Having carefully
examined respondent's testimony in its entirety, we conclude
that his operations are those of a common carrier. It is clear
that the only restrictiveness placed upon such operations is
controlled by the limitations of respondent's equipment and
his desire to hold in reserve equipment adequate to meet the
reqnirementsof so-called regular customers. This, in our
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opinion, is not sufficient to remove the operations from a common carrier status."
At the time of the opinion and order, this court had not
decided Souza v. Public Utilities Com., 37 Ca1.2d 539 [233
P.2d 537], and Samuelson v. Public Utilities Com., 36 Ca1.2d
722 [227 P.2d 256]. Following the decision in the Samuelson
case, the commission granted Alves a rehearing for the purpose of considering its applicability, if any, to the issues determined by the order against him. Pending rehearing, the
Souza case also was decided. On rehearing, the commission
entered a new order requiring Alves to cease and desist from
operating without a certificate as a highway common carrier
between designated fixed termini. The listing of prohibited
termini was altered from that in the original order. The order
on rehearing also suspended Alves' permits to operate as a
radial highway common carrier and as a highway contract
carrier, but the term of suspension was set at three days.
The opinion on rehearing took cognizance of the Samuelson
and Souza cases. Abandoning the ground of "restrictiveness" upon which it had relied in its original opinion, the
commission stated: "We are aware that the court in the Sa.muelson and Souza cases (supra) rejected the test of 'substantial restrictiveness' for determining whether a trucker is a
common carrier, and of course we respect and accept its judgment. However, the evidence in this proceeding amply demonstrates that the respondent has held out his services to the
public or a portion thereof as is indicated by the wide variety
of commodities he transported, shipments of which ranged in
weight from one pound to 198,180 pounds, and the large number of persons he served in addition to the one shipper with
whom he had a written contract and four others with whom he
had oral arrangements. This record cogently establishes that
the respondent has evinced the unequivocal intention to dedicate his property to a public use required by the court's ruling
in the Samuelson and Souza cases (supra), and we therefore
:find that the respondent is engaged in common carriage."
In the present proceeding, Alves, by writ of review, is challenging the jurisdiction of the commission to curtail his operations. The controversy centers upon the sufficiency of the
evidence to support its order.
There is no serious dispute as to the faets. Briefly stated,
they are as follows:
Alves commenced business in 1946 with two trucks. At
present, his fleet consists of 14 tractors, 14 semitrailers, and
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two "bob-tail" trucks. At all times since 1946 he has held
radial higbway common carrier and highway contract carrier
permits. He has never held, nor applied for, a certificate of
public convenience and necesSity to operate as a highway common carrier.
He maintains offices, with facilities for parking equipment,
in San Leandro and Los Angeles. Although he operates on
no fixed schedule, almost daily his trucks carry shipments between the San Francisco Bay area and the Los Angeles area
in both directions. The shortest route between the point of
departure and the destination is used. Besides his frequent
service between the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas, he
transports goods to a large number of other points throughout
the state.
According to Alves, he does not ~olicit any business or
advertise, although his name appc~rs in the classified section
of the telephone directory. During the first six months after
he commenced business, about 10 persons· tendered property
to him for transportation. In 1948, his customers consisted
of at least 27 different persons or corporations. He added 10
more shippers in 1949 and another six in 1950. He has a
written contract with only one of these customers. With four
others he has oral contracts, although in at least two instances
there is some dispute as to whether the oral agreement conbtitutes a binding contract. His list of customers is variable,
some being dropped and some being added from time to time.
Shipping orders are accepted by telephone. The evidence
.reasonably would support a finding that he accepts newcustomers within the limitS of his equipment, and that any refusals to carry goods have been based upon economic considerations.
Apparently he is willing to carry any type of freight. His
shipments range in weight from one pound to 19~,180 pounds
and in type from fresh flowers to heavy machinery. The equipreent which he uses is similar to that of other carriers, rather
than being of any specialized type to meet the needs of particular customers.
Alves contends that· he does not operate as a bigh,vay common carrier, nor does he operate between fixed termini or over
a regular route. The evidence, he says, is insufficient to sustain the finding that he has dedicated his property to a public
use. In addition, he argues that the suspension of his permits
was arbitrary, unreasonable, and an abuse of discretion. By
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its answer to his petition, the commission disputes each of
these contentions.
The situation here presented is entirely different from that
in the Samuelson and Souza cases, supra, upon which Alves
relies. Samuelson was operating under only 8 highway contract carrier permit. His operations were restricted to an
arbitrary limit of 80 shippers at anyone time. He had served
only 47 shippers during his entire period of operations. He
did not solicit business and he limited the type of freight
which he would carry. With all shippers he had written or
oral contracts. The commission issued a cease and desist order
upon the ground that Samuelson was not conducting his business with "substantial restrictiveness." This court annulled
the order because there was no showing that Samuelson unequivocally intended to dedicate his property to a public use.
We said: "The 'substantial restrictiveness' doctrine excludes
this intention, or at least reduces it to only incidental importance." (P. 783.)
In the Souza case a substantially similar situation was presented, although Souza was operating under both radial highway common carrier and highway contract carrier permits.
From the record, however, it appeared that he had not operated as a common carrier, despite the fact that he had a
permit to do so. This court, for the same reasons as those
stated in the Samuelson case, aunulled the commission's order
suspending his permits. We held it unnecessary to. consider
the question whether the commission could properly refuse
to separate a permittee's common carrier operations from his
contract carrier business.
[1] In the instant case, however, there is evidence of a
large scale and growing enterprise serving aU profitable business offered within the limitations of its equipment. The vast
majority of shippers are served without contractual arrangements. No limit is placed on the type, or weight, of product
carried. It does not appear that any profitable business was
refused, or that any limit was placed upon the number of
shippers served. From such evidence, the commission reasonably could conclude that Alves unequivocally intended to
dedicatebis property to a public use. The evidence of frequent service between certain cities is also sufficient to support
a finding that, at least as to some of his business, he operated
between fixed termini.
But -even if Alves was operating as a common carrier, he
held a valid permit entitling him to do 80. There is also evi-
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dence tending to prove that, in addition to common carriage,
he was operating as a highway contract carrier, for which
he likewise held a permit. It becomes important, therefore,
to distinguish carefully between the various types of operation
which Alves might have conducted.
The Highway Oarriers' Act (Stats. 1935, ch. 223, p. 878,
as amended; 2 Deering's Gen. IJaws. 1949 Supp., Act 5129a;
repealed by Stats. 1951, ch. 764, pp. 2025, 2257-2258; now
Pub. Util. Oode, § 3501 et seq.) at the time of the commence·
ment of this proceeding contained the following definitions:
HThe term 'highway common carrier' when used in this act
means every highway carrier operating as a common carrier
subject to regulation as such by the Railroad Oommission
under the Public Utilities Act of the State of Oalifornia as
amended." (§ l[g]; now Pub. Util. Oode, § 3513.)
"The term I radial highway common carrier' when used in
this act means every highway carrier operating as a common
carrier not heretofore subject to regulation as such by the
Railroad Oommission under the Public Utilities Act of the
State of Oalifornia, as amended." (§ l[h]; now Pub. Util.
Code, § 3516.)
"The term I highway contract camer' when used in this act
means every highway carrier other than a highway common
carrier as defined in subsection (g) and every radial highway
common carrier as defined in subsection (h)." (§ l[i]; now
Pub. Util. Oode, § 3517.)
Section 2% of the Public Utilities Act (Stats. 1915, ch. 91,
p. 115, as add('d by Stats. 1935, ch. 664, p. 1831, as amended;
2 Deering's Gen. Laws, 1949 Supp., Act 6386; repealed by
Stats. 1951, ch. 764, pp. 2025, 2257; now Pub. Util. Code,
§ 201 et seq.) provided these further definitions:
"The term 'highway common carrier' when used in this act
means every corporation or person, ... operating . . . any
auto truck . . . used in the business of tram;portation of
property as a common carrier for compensation over any pub.
lic highway in this State between fixed termini or over a
regular route, . . . " (§ 2% [a] ; now Pub. Util. Code, § 213.)
"The words 'between fixed termini or over a regular route'
when used in this act mean the termini or route between or
over which any highway common carrier usually or ordinarily operates any auto truck . . . even though there may
be departures from said termini or route, whether such
departures be periodic or irregular. Whether or not any
auto truck • • • is operated by a highway common carrier
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'between fixed termini or over a regular route' within the
meaning of this act shall be a question of fact and the findings
of the commission thereon shall be subject to review." (§ 2%
[b] ; now Pub. Utile Code, § 215.)
Reading these various definitions as a whole, the following pattern of possible types of transportation appears.
[2] A "highway common carrier . . . subject to regulation as
such" by the Public Utilities Commission is a highway carrier
transporting" property as a common carrier for compensation
• • . between fixed termini or over a regular route." A common carrier by auto truck which does not operate between
fixed termini or over a regular route is a "radial highway
common carrier." Thus, the difference between two possible
types of common carriage is dependent upon whether it is
performed "between fixed termini or over a regular route."
[3] The third possible type of highway carriage with which
we are concerned is the "highway contract carrier," defined
by exclusion as every highway carrier which is not a common
earrier operating between fixed termini or over a regular
route. In other words, if it does not operate as a common
carrier, the highway contract carrier may operate between
fixed termini or over a regular route.
[4] Alves held permits to operate both as a radial highway
common carrier and as a highway contract carrier. Thus,
under the quoted statutory definitions, he legally could operate
as a common carrier; he could also transport goods as a contract carrier between fixed termini or over a regular route.
But he could not operate as a common carrier between fixed
termini or over a regular route. The commission has entirely
ignored this essential distinction. Although it found that
Alves operated as a highway common carrier between fixed
termini and over regular routes, it did not find that he conducted specified common carrier operations between certain
fixed termini. The specific findings are simply that he operated as a common carrier and that he operated between certain
fixed termini.
In a supplemental brief, filed at the request of this court,
the commission states that it treated the problem "as having
two parts, ,. each of which it resolved separately. It first determined whether Alves was operating as a common carrier,
without regard to the termini served. Then, assuming "that
the carrier's operations are those of a common carricr," it
determined whether h(l opernt('o between particular pairs of
termini, or over particular routes.
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According to the commission, it "does not claim that the
evidence in the present record warrants a finding that operations between any particular pair of termini, . . . considered
apart from the rest, were those of a common carrier." It
states: "Having found that ... [Alves') business, considered as an undifferentiated whole, was that of a common carrier, and having then found that some of his operations were
between fixed termini and over regular routes, the Commission considered that . . • [his) operations between those termini and over those routes were those of a common carrier."
In effect, the commission concedes that there is no evidence
which would support a finding that Alves transported property as a common carrier between fixed termini or over a
regular route.
[5] The commission apparently is relying upon the rule
which it laid down in Pacific Southwest Ra'tlroad Assn. v.
Stapel, 49 Cal. Pub. UtiI. Com. 407. It there said that it will
not consider a carrier's operations in segments. If a carrier
operates a portion of an integrated business as a common carrier, and another portion of its business as a contract carrier
between fixed termini, applying the rule of the Stapel case,
the commission will combine the entire business to find that
the carrier is operating as a common carrier between fixed
termini. Such a rule is arbitrary and unreasonable, at least
as applied to a carrier holding both radial highway common
carrier and highway contract carrier permits. By the Stapel
rule, as to such a carrier, legal operation. under each permit
would constitute illegal operation as a highway common carrier.
In this case, there being no evidence of operations between
fixed termini as a common carrier, application of the Stapel
rule contravenes section 4 of the Highway Carriers' Act.
(Stats. 1935, ch. 223, p. 878, as amended; 2 Deering'S Gen.
Laws [1943), Act 5129a; repealed by Stats..1951, ch. 764,
pp. 2025, 2257-2258; now Pub. UtH. Code, § 3542.) It provided: "No person or corporation shall be permitted by the
Railroad Commission to engage, nor shall any person or corporation engage in the transportation of property on the
public highway, both as a common carrier and as a highway
contract carrier of the same commodities between the same
points. " [6] The clear implication of the statute is that a
carrier may engage in both common and contract carriage, so
long as the same commodities are not carried between the
same points in both capacities. Whether Alves has violated

)
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the stai.t:u restriction bas not been decided by the commission,
and the evidence does not tend to show any such violation.
The order is annulled.
Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.

)

TRAYNOR, J.-Alves has permits under which he may
legally operate both as a radial common carrier and ru; a
highway contract carrier. Under these permits he may operate
as a contract carrier between fixed termini or over regular
routes; he may not do so, however, as a common carrier.
Since part of his operations are between fixed termini, the
question presented is whether there is substantial evidence
to support the commission's finding that he conducts these
operations as a common carrier rather than as a contract
carrier. Since the commission concedes that the evidence
would not support a finding "that operations between any
particular pair of termini, . . . considered apart from tke
rest, were those of a common carrier," the majority opinion
concludes that there is no evidence to support the commission's finding. (Italics added.) In this case, however, the
determination of the character of the carriage between any
particular pair of termini cannot be made by considering such
carriage by itself.
In Samuelson v. Public Utilities Com., 36 Cal.2d 722, 733
[227 P.2d 256], the court stated that "the common law test
of common carriage . . . requires an unequivocal intention
to dedicate property to a public use." (See, also, Souza v.
Public Utilities Corn., 37 Ca1.2d 539, 543 [233 P.2d 537).) As
the majority opinion points out, this intent may be manifested
by the manner in which the business is conducted: •• In the
instant case, however, there is evidence of a large scale and
growing enterprise serving all profitable business offered within the limitations of its equipment. The vast majority of
shippers are served without contractual arrangements. No
limit is placed on the type, or weight, of product carried. It
does not appear that any profitable business was refused, or
that any limit was placed upon the number of shippers served.
From such evidence, the commission reasonably could conclude
that Alves unequivocally intended to dedicate his property to
a public use." If consideration is restricted, however, to a
particular segment of the business, it may be impossible to
determine what the carrier's intent is. Thus as between a
.riven pair of termini, the carriage, although regular, may be
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for so fe,,, shippers that it cannot be determined whether the
carrier is selecting his clientele, or in reality holding himself
out to serve the public generally. In such cases only by
looking to the overall plan of the carrier's operations can it be
determined on what basis he is operating the limited segments
thereof. Thus if it appears from the overall operations that
the business is being conducted on a common carrier basis,
it is reasonable to infer that the regular carriage between each
pair of termini is being conducted in the same manner.
To permit this inference to be drawn does not result in
denying a carrier having both radial common carrier and
highway contract carrier permits the right to conduct both
types of business. By implying that it does, the majority
opinion confuses the question of what types of operations are
legally permissible with the question of how the existence of
any given type may be proved. If in fact the operations between fixed termini or over regular routes are conducted on a
contract rather than on a common carrier basis, the carrier
should have no difficulty in so showing. In the present case,
however, the evidence of the character of the operations between each pair of termini, when considered alone, is equivocal.
Alves has not demonstrated that his method of operation between fixed termini differs from his method of operation in
general. Accordingly, the commission was justified in concluding that the general pattern of common carrier operation
that appeared from Alves' business when considered as a
whole, established that his operations between fixed termini
were of the same sort.
I would affirm the order.
Gibson, C. J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied September
10, 1953. Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and SPCl1CC, J., were of
th .. opinion that the petition .should be 4:ranted..
61. c.3I:l-ll
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